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Measuring Justice: 
Internal Conflict over the World Bank’s Empirical Approach to Human Rights 
 
Galit A. Sarfaty 
 
 
(Book chapter in Mirrors of Justice: Law and Power in the Post-Cold War Era  
(Kamari Clarke & Mark Goodale eds., Cambridge Univ. Press, 2009)) 
 
 
 
How can we measure justice?  Are there tensions between an instrumental and an 
intrinsic conception of justice?  These questions are currently being debated within the 
World Bank, an international development agency founded in 1946 under a mandate of 
poverty reduction.  On May 15-16, 2006, members of the Bank’s Legal Department led a 
workshop on developing justice indicators that examined these questions.  The 
participants included thirty Bank employees, the Nordic-Baltic Foreign Ministries, and 
experts from four continents.  The Bank organized the workshop in preparation for a new 
trust fund on justice and human rights, aimed at the “practical” promotion of human 
rights considerations at the institution.  One of the objectives of the workshop was to 
“consider ‘what measuring justice means,’ including both the objective of and 
methodologies for doing so.”1   
The Measuring Justice Initiative, which attempts to quantify the performance of 
the justice sector in developing countries, is part of a larger trend in the Bank to 
empirically measure normative concepts.  My research focuses on the institution’s 
empirical treatment of human rights and its support for an instrumentalist interpretation 
of the concept.  One example of this recent approach is the Bank’s Human Rights 
                                                
1 Report of the Justice and Human Rights Initiative, Workshop on Developing Justice Indicators, Oslo 
(May 15-16, 2006). 
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Indicator Project, a parallel initiative to Measuring Justice, which began in 2005 and is 
also based in the Legal Department.  This project aims to develop a methodology and 
operational tools to measure and assess human rights and integrate them into 
development processes.  It is an effort to demystify human rights for employees, 
particularly some economists, who remain skeptical of their value for the Bank’s work. 
Yet if one were to examine this project in isolation, one would overlook the 
multiplicity of human rights interpretations among employees.  Whereas some promote 
human rights as instrumental goals toward achieving poverty reduction, others define 
them as legal obligations or as moral imperatives.  Meanwhile, there is a sizable minority 
of staff who interpret them as political considerations that are beyond the Bank’s 
mandate.   
 Why is the Bank exhibiting such divergent approaches to human rights?  I argue 
that the “interpretive pluralism” over human rights reveals contradictions within the 
Bank’s bureaucratic culture and, in particular, a tension between principles and 
pragmatism.  This chapter seeks to analyze the internal conflicts that led to the current 
empirical approach by presenting a genealogy of human rights at the Bank.  My analysis 
is based on ethnographic fieldwork at the World Bank headquarters in Washington, D.C. 
over a period of two years, including the summers of 2002 and 2004 and the 2005-2006 
academic year.  I demonstrate that human rights has been a taboo topic within parts of the 
institution, but the type and extent of the taboo has changed over time and in different 
contexts.  Moreover, when the concept of human rights has been incorporated into Bank 
discourses and practices, it has often been in a partial or inconsistent manner.  
Before I proceed to discuss the human rights taboo, I would like to clarify how 
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human rights can relate to the work of the Bank.  The institution may be implicated in 
human rights in at least three possible activities: (i) the Bank’s lending of money to 
governments that violate human rights; (ii) its direct or indirect violation of human rights 
through its projects (e.g., the forcible displacement of indigenous peoples resulting from 
a Bank-financed dam project); and (iii) the Bank’s promotion of human rights through its 
work (e.g., designing projects with specific human rights objectives).  Human rights here 
include economic, social, and cultural rights, as well as civil and political rights. 
 
The Human Rights Taboo and its Historical Origins 
 
 
 There has been and continues to be a taboo on human rights in the Bank’s policies 
and much of its practice.  Despite years of internal and external pressure and the 
institution’s adoption of a number of social and environmental policies, the Bank has no 
overarching operational policy or guidelines on human rights.2  Moreover, the Bank has 
not adopted a rights-based approach to development as have many other agencies, 
including the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the United Nations 
Children’s Fund, and the UK’s Department for International Development.  Human rights 
concerns are not systematically incorporated into the decision making of staff or 
consistently taken into consideration in projects, although there are some exceptions.3  
Existing incorporation is mostly ad hoc and up to the discretion of employees.  The 
marginality of human rights in official policies stands in contrast to the Bank’s rhetoric, 
including official reports and public speeches by its leadership in support of the issue. 
                                                
2 Although there are no operational policies that directly concern human rights, the Indigenous Peoples 
Policy does briefly refer to the human rights of indigenous peoples.  
3 For instance, some Bank documents have referred to human rights, and employees do indirectly work on 
human rights, particularly economic, social, and cultural rights (as I discuss later in this chapter). 
 4 
 Not only have human rights not been incorporated into the Bank’s official 
policies, but they are also not openly discussed within many parts of the institution.  
Many employees consider it taboo to discuss the topic in conversation and to include 
references to it in their project documents.  The Bank is an environment of tabooed 
topics, which become part of the everyday consciousness of employees and encoded in 
their daily routines.  Employees have been socialized to adopt a set of attitudes and 
beliefs about human rights and its relationship to the Bank.    
The taboo against talking about human rights is part of a larger taboo against 
explicitly addressing ethical issues in general.  Even though employees clearly face moral 
or ethical dilemmas in their work, they are usually not encouraged to speak about them 
publicly.  Many employees often refrain from discussing rights and wrongs and instead 
prefer to talk about trade-offs.  According to a senior official, much of the Bank’s work 
revolves around an ethos of technical excellence and objectivity.  When this official met 
with staff about ethical issues, she found that “people [felt] that they are expected to do 
things or asked to do things in countries which they’re not necessarily comfortable 
with.”4  She further mentioned that the Bank’s institutional culture with regard to ethics 
contrasts to that of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), where she briefly worked.  At the UNHCR, ethical and moral issues were 
constantly on the agenda and discussed openly among staff.5 
What are the origins of the human rights taboo?  Employees that I interviewed 
most often cited legal restrictions in the Bank’s Articles of Agreement as the primary 
reason for why they do not discuss human rights or explicitly cite them in project 
                                                
4 Interview with official, Office of the President, World Bank, in Washington, D.C. (May 15, 2006). 
5 Ibid. 
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documents.  The restrictions arise from provisions in Article IV, Section 10 and Article 
III, Section 5(b).6  Article IV, Section 10 prohibits political activity and permits only 
economic considerations in decision making: 
 
The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; 
nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the 
member or members concerned.  Only economic considerations shall be relevant 
to their decisions, and these considerations shall be weighted impartially in order 
to achieve the purposes stated in Article I. 
 
 
Article III, Section 5(b) limits the factors that the Bank can consider in the granting of 
loans and restricts political considerations: 
 
The Bank shall make arrangements to ensure that the proceeds of any loan are 
used only for the purposes for which the loan was granted, with due attention to 
considerations of economy and efficiency and without regard to political or other 
non-economic influences or considerations. 
 
 
These provisions have stymied the Bank’s explicit promotion of human rights, 
particularly civil and political rights, which have been interpreted as political 
considerations or interferences in the political affairs of member countries.  Bank 
officials have historically viewed economic, social, and cultural rights as less problematic 
because they are considered to be more consistent with the Bank’s mandate.   
Another reason for the taboo has been political constraints arising from the 
Bank’s Board of Executive Directors, which is deeply divided over the issue of human 
rights.  Some countries like China and Saudi Arabia are highly opposed to an explicit 
human rights agenda that would include the protection of civil and political rights (which 
they view as a reflection of Western values).  Other countries like India and Brazil 
                                                
6 Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, July 22, 1944. 
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(middle-income countries that are responsible for a substantial portion of the Bank’s 
revenue) fear that a focus on human rights would increase transaction costs for loans.  
Their view is that if the institution used human rights protection as a conditionality on 
lending, it would adversely affect many borrower countries with poor human rights 
records while not impacting similarly situated donor countries.  Some countries also 
caution that a human rights conditionality would significantly hinder the Bank’s poverty 
reduction goals and turn the institution into a policeman for the developing world. 
There are a number of other related reasons that employees cite for why they do 
not address human rights.  They include: (i) human rights work is beyond the Bank’s 
mission of poverty reduction, and other organizations like the UN have the mandate and 
expertise to work on this issue; and (ii) human rights and a rights-based approach to 
development are difficult to operationalize because they are too abstract and vague. 
 The strongest enforcers of the taboo have historically been lawyers in the Legal 
Department, although there is often self-policing among employees.  Because Bank 
lawyers are responsible for interpreting and applying the Articles of Agreement, they 
have been the most cautious in referring to human rights in project documents.  As 
recently as 2004, when the Social Development Unit wrote its strategy paper, the Legal 
Department required the deletion of any reference to “human rights.”  The authors of the 
strategy paper had to resort to using less “political” words like inclusion, cohesion, and 
accountability (World Bank 2005).  It is therefore surprising that certain members of the 
Legal Department are currently spearheading initiatives on human rights, including the 
Measuring Justice Initiative and the Human Rights Indicator Project.  According to a 
senior Bank official, the Legal Department felt a particular burden to take up the human 
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rights agenda because it had been policing Bank discourse on the topic for so many 
years.7  
 
The Taboo’s Evolution 
 
Internal and external pressure over the past two decades has influenced the Bank 
to reexamine its approach to human rights although not to significantly alter it.  Non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) like Human Rights Watch, the Bank Information 
Center, and Oxfam International have pressured the institution to adopt a more holistic 
approach to development and recognize that issues like human rights are directly related 
to the Bank’s economic aims.  They have joined internal advocates, academics, and 
human rights experts like Mary Robinson, former UN High Commissioner on Human 
Rights, in stressing the interdependence between human rights and development.  
Moreover, the Bank has recently felt pressure from some private financial institutions 
that have adopted a more progressive stance on human rights out of a concern for their 
public image and the reputational risk of committing human rights abuses. 
In 1995, James Wolfensohn became President of the Bank and ushered in an era 
of more open dialogue on human rights.  According to Wolfensohn, it took about three to 
four years to educate staff that human rights was an important issue within the context of 
the Bank’s work.8  Under his leadership, the Bank published its first official report on 
human rights, which recognized the institution’s role in promoting and protecting human 
rights but stopped short of stating that it had an international legal obligation to do so 
(World Bank 1998).  Since the report’s publication in 1998, Bank documents and 
                                                
7 Interview with senior official, Legal Department, World Bank, in Washington, D.C. (May 25, 2006). 
8 Interview with James Wolfensohn, former President, World Bank, in New York, N.Y. (June 14, 2007). 
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speeches have periodically mentioned human rights, although the Bank’s Board of 
Executive Directors has continued to oppose its official incorporation into institutional 
policy.9  As official rhetoric has adjusted over time, the type and extent of the human 
rights taboo has changed as well.  As I will further describe later in this chapter, there 
have been various manifestations of this change within the institution.   
 
Selective Application of the Taboo (by Topic and Country) 
 
 
The taboo against working on and speaking about human rights has not applied 
equally to all rights, sectors, and countries.  Historically, the institution has more openly 
engaged in economic, social, and cultural rights, as opposed to civil and political rights. 
Many Bank projects and programs directly target the realization of these rights, such as 
the rights to education and health.  Civil and political rights have not been recognized as 
part of the Bank’s work because they have been interpreted as beyond its mandate and 
not directly related to its mission of poverty reduction. Although the Bank has begun to 
pay attention to such issues as legal and judicial reform and corruption, it still refuses to 
fund police, prosecutors, and prisons.  A justice reform project typically only provides 
funding for the training of judges and administrative support for courts, but not for the 
criminal justice sector.  The inability to fund police and prisons has become a huge 
impediment for Bank project managers working in such countries as the Sudan, where 
support for these components is critical in any development initiative.10  As a result, other 
                                                
9 See DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, STRATEGIES FOR ACHIEVING THE INTERNATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT TARGETS: HUMAN RIGHTS FOR POOR PEOPLE 16 (2000) (concluding that “the reluctance of 
some of [the Bank’s] shareholders . . . to incorporate human rights into its development work could 
constrain its poverty reduction strategies”).   
10 Interview with official, Legal Department, World Bank, in Washington, D.C. (May 1, 2006). 
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donors like the UNDP have taken a leadership role in administering criminal justice 
projects in these countries. 
The Bank has addressed human rights more openly with regard to particular 
rights-holders, including indigenous peoples and women.  For instance, its Indigenous 
Peoples Policy is its only operational policy that explicitly uses the term “human rights”: 
It aims to ensure that “the development process fosters full respect for the dignity, human 
rights, and cultural uniqueness” of indigenous peoples.  The Bank does not have a similar 
policy to address the rights of other vulnerable peoples, such as ethnic minorities, 
although some of its projects have targeted distinct minorities like the Roma in Eastern 
Europe or Afro-descendants in Latin America.  In the area of gender equality, the Bank 
has applied a rights-based approach as delineated in its 2001 report, Engendering 
Development – Through Gender Equality in Rights, Resources and Voice.  In addition, its 
Country Policy and Institutional Assessments (a rating system for determining resource 
allocation to the poorest borrower countries) includes ratification of the Convention on 
the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) as a criterion 
for assessment.   
Moreover, Bank employees selectively apply the taboo on projects in certain 
countries but not others.  For example, they avoid using the term or taking a rights-based 
approach in influential countries that have voiced strong opposition, like China and Saudi 
Arabia.  Given that these countries are considered important borrowers from the Bank 
and a significant source of its revenue, employees working on projects in these countries 
are often pressured to avoid explicit references to human rights for fear of angering 
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government officials.  They know that these countries could easily seek funding from the 
private sector if they become dissatisfied with the Bank. 
 Let us compare the approaches used for two Bank projects related to HIV/AIDS 
control, prevention, and/or treatment: the Tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS Control Project in 
the Russian Federation (approved on April 3, 2003) and the HIV/AIDS Prevention and 
Control Project in St. Lucia in the Caribbean (approved on July 6, 2004).  There is a 
significant disparity between how, and the extent to which, each project explicitly frames 
HIV/AIDS as a human rights issue.  According to the UN Commission for Human 
Rights’ international guidelines on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights (1997), the realization 
of rights by people living with HIV/AIDS requires protection against stigma and 
discrimination with regard to access to health, education, and social services.11  The St. 
Lucia project includes components on reducing stigma and discrimination as well as legal 
reforms for ensuring universal civil, economic, and social rights.  The Russia project, in 
contrast, emphasizes prevention and control, and also provides treatment for persons 
infected.  There are no components on stigma and discrimination nor any explicit 
recognition of the need to ensure universal civil, economic, and social rights, as is 
mentioned in the St. Lucia project.  The decision not to frame HIV/AIDS in human rights 
terms in the Russia project is in large part due to politics in the borrower country.  The 
Russian government is more cautious about human rights and HIV/AIDS, which are 
viewed as sensitive, politically charged topics.  Even if the St. Lucian government took 
the same view, Russia holds much more influence than St. Lucia over Bank project 
                                                
11 International Guidelines on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights, UNHCR res. 1997/33, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1997/150 (1997). 
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design because it is a major borrower from the Bank and one that the Bank does not want 
to upset.12   
 Thus staff members have applied divergent human rights approaches based on the 
country in which they are working.  An employee that I interviewed who is sympathetic 
to the rights-based approach nonetheless did not apply it when implementing projects in 
very low-income countries: 
 
In a country like Haiti where the budget is so small, it wouldn’t be very helpful to 
talk to them about a broad human rights approach to everything they need to do.  
And then this poor government . . . would say, “Oh, what do I do first?”  And 
we’d give them a list of 600 things, and they’d throw in the towel and what would 
we do then?  So based on what their budget is and where we think they have 
capacity and where there’s some ownership and communities around it, that’s 
where you move forward first and hopefully produce results that then gives them 
a bit more legitimacy and credibility, and you push a bit further. . . .  So we had to 
sit down and decide what is the trade-off between focusing on infrastructure and 
education in Haiti before health.13 
 
 
Determining how to make such a trade-off is difficult for many employees and leads to 
inconsistent implementation of projects across countries.  
 
Explicit Exceptions to the Taboo 
 
There are settings in the Bank where the human rights taboo does not apply at all.  
Internal critics have made space within the institution where controversial topics like 
human rights can be discussed and alliances can be forged with external advocates.  The 
most prominent example is the Friday Morning Group (FMG), which serves as a tolerant 
                                                
12 For a detailed comparison of the two projects’ treatment of HIV/AIDS as a human rights issue, see 
Sarfaty 2007. 
13 Interview with official, Civil Society Team, Latin America and Caribbean Region, World Bank, in 
Washington, D.C. (May 23, 2006). 
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venue, or an “oasis” in the words of one member, for the exchange of new ideas.14  Since 
1979, this small group of staff has met every Friday to candidly discuss the values of 
development work.  Participants and outside speakers are asked to talk about the ethical 
values that motivate their work, and how they relate to the values supported by the Bank.  
The group is considered “a rare ‘safe space,’ a place where there is respectful support for 
ideas and gentle or not so gentle challenges and questions” (Cadario & Marshall 2006).  
Many issues that were once considered controversial and became mainstream in the Bank 
over time were first introduced at the FMG.  Examples of such topics include the 
environment, corruption, debt relief, and indigenous peoples.15  Employees have also 
discussed ethical dilemmas in projects, such as the controversial China—Western 
Poverty Reduction Project in 2004 that led to protests by human rights NGOs on behalf 
of the people of Tibet.  At the time of the incident, the FMG scheduled a discussion 
between a Bank director from the East Asia region and representatives from the 
International Campaign for Tibet and two other NGOs.  In this respect, the FMG has 
encouraged an open exchange of views regarding important human rights issues facing 
staff.  
Another alternative outlet that recently sprung up is the Critical Development 
Thinking (CDT) Group, which is composed of young Bank employees and external 
activists who share a commitment to social justice and seek to bring critical perspectives 
into their work.  In addition to organizing discussions and debates on alternative 
approaches to development, the CDT Group met with former Bank President Paul 
                                                
14 Interview with official, Operations Evaluation Department, World Bank, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 16, 
2005). 
15 Interview with official, Global Development Learning Network, World Bank Institute, in Washington, 
D.C. (Nov. 10, 2005). 
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Wolfowitz and established a regular channel with his office to share recommendations on 
promoting accountability.  To take action on priority topics like human rights, ethics, and 
social justice, the CDT Group has cooperated with NGOs like the Bank Information 
Center and has invited speakers from social movements like the landless workers 
movement in Brazil.  In doing so, members of the CDT Group have pursued external 
alliances to bring up concerns like human rights that are still taboo within many parts of 
the institution. 
 
 Variations of the Taboo  
 
Although there may be a taboo among many employees on explicitly invoking 
human rights, the taboo has not extended to implicit human rights work.  Some Bank 
officials are committed to human rights principles but frame their work in alternative 
terms.  Scholars have referred to this practice as “rhetorical repackaging” (Uvin 2004).  
In addition, there are officials who adhere to the capabilities approach, which shares 
many of the same concerns as the human rights approach such as human freedom and 
dignity.16  
To capture some of the meanings behind human rights without using the term, 
Bank employees have referred to other principles like social development, participation, 
inclusion, social accountability, transparency, good governance, and empowerment.  
These terms are considered “bywords” that, as one employee explained, are simply 
                                                
16 However, according to Amartya Sen, human rights is a much broader framework than the capabilities 
approach because it includes due process rights (such as fair treatment) that are not considered to be 
capabilities.  (Interview with Amartya Sen, Professor of Economics, Harvard University, in Washington, 
D.C. (May 23, 2006)).  See also Sen 2004, 336. 
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“different filters on the same lens.”17  Many employees prefer them to rights language 
because they are considered less political, more easily defined, more receptive to 
measurement, and more negotiable to trade-offs.  As a result, “you avoid all the internal 
obstacles as well as our Board’s obstacles, and you could still do the same job.”18  Yet, 
these bywords do not carry the same legal and rhetorical weight as human rights.  One 
Bank lawyer expressed misgivings about “how much violence you do to the concept of 
human rights by going very far under other banners and other discourses.”  He was 
frustrated over “the lack of recognition [among Bank staff] of the limits of doing human 
rights work but calling it something else.”19  Thus, one way that the taboo has changed 
over the past few years is that some employees are adhering to human rights principles 
but framing them in alternative terms.  The question remains whether this type of framing 
dilutes the substance of human rights. 
 Another variation of the taboo is employees’ support for particular interpretations 
of human rights and avoidance of others.  The recent human rights efforts by members of 
the Legal Department reveal a preference for an instrumental interpretation over an 
intrinsic interpretation of human rights, which is grounded in the international human 
rights legal framework and defines human rights as legally binding duties on states.  The 
preference for an instrumental interpretation arises from the dominance of economists 
and an economic way of thinking within the institution.   A senior economist observed: 
 
Things really happen in the Bank when an economic case could be made for 
them.  You put it in economic language.  This is how corruption came in.  It sort 
                                                
17 Interview with official, Operations Evaluation Department, World Bank, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 16, 
2005). 
18 Interview with official, Civil Society Team, Latin America and Caribbean Region, World Bank, in 
Washington, D.C. (May 23, 2006). 
19 Interview with official, Legal Department, World Bank, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 17, 2006). 
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of became acceptable internally to talk about corruption when people could show 
with cross-country regressions that it’s related to lower growth.  Similarly, [that’s 
what happened with] some of these governance indicators related to democracy, 
and transparency of law, and social capital.  People needed [empirical evidence] 
to say that okay, it’s alright for us to work on this.  So one obstacle would be to 
try and articulate rights issues in the way that economists could understand.”20 
 
 
Because of the need to appeal to economists in the Bank, the lawyers leading the current 
initiative have favored an instrumental framework, which provides a functionalist 
rationale for promoting human rights (as a means to an end) and measures their value 
based on whether they enhance development effectiveness and make good business 
sense.  Some employees perceive this approach as easier to operationalize because it is 
more flexible to the resource constraints that development practitioners face in borrower 
countries.  The current Measuring Justice Initiative and Human Rights Indicator Project 
reflect this empirical approach to value-normative concepts.   
 
A Tension Between Principles and Pragmatism at the World Bank 
 
The selective application of the human rights taboo and the variations on and 
exceptions to it suggest that the Bank’s approach to human rights is not uniform.  How 
are we to understand the conflicting approaches within the institution and the evolution of 
the taboo over time?  I contend that there are contradictions within the Bank’s 
organizational culture that reflect a tension between principles and pragmatism (i.e., a 
tension between pursuing normative, intangible values and goals, and finding a practical 
way to solve problems), which may involve trade-offs between competing principles.   
                                                
20 Interview with official, Development Research Group, World Bank, in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 14, 
2006). 
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 The tension between principles and pragmatism is apparent in the internal 
struggles among Bank lawyers and within lawyers themselves over how to define and 
frame human rights.  Many lawyers have welcomed an economic framing as the only 
entry point to bringing human rights into the institution.  However, they are also 
concerned that human rights be used “in the right way,” referring to a legalistic 
interpretation.21  Because they view concepts like human rights and justice as abstract and 
somewhat ambiguous, they are attempting to empirically measure them so as to better 
operationalize them in projects.  Such an approach is aimed at getting economists on 
board by instrumentalizing human rights and valuing them for their contribution to 
poverty reduction rather than for their intrinsic value.  As one Bank lawyer declared, 
“The mainstream way of convincing and persuading people is an economistic way of 
seeing things.  Unfortunately, all the other disciplines, like social development for 
example, are forced to use that language to make their case.  And I think that’s unfair in a 
way.  It’s raising the bar for their arguments to be accepted.  [But] that’s really the 
dominant way of doing business [at the Bank].”22  
Given their legal training, lawyers have worried over whether they are 
compromising on the substance of human rights.  They recognize that there are risks in 
taking an overly technical approach to rights that uses empirical tools like indicators and 
checklists.  They insist that it “is essential . . . that efforts to integrate human rights in 
development practice not compromise those key characteristics [of legal obligations and 
duties] in the process, and risk the impoverishment of rights discourse and the 
                                                
21 Interview with Deputy General Counsel, Legal Department, World Bank, in Washington, D.C. (May 25, 
2006). 
22 Interview with official, Legal Department, World Bank, in Washington, D.C. (May 1, 2006). 
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undermining of core values and objectives that human rights were conceived to realize” 
(Decker et al. 2005: 49).   
In an environment like the Bank where nearly everything seems to be subject to 
cost-benefit analysis, many employees are troubled by principles that appear to be non-
negotiable and not subject to trade-offs.  There are costs to trying to commensurate 
seemingly incommensurable values.  In her analysis of the struggle between Yavapai 
Indians and the Bureau of Reclamation over a dam in Arizona, Wendy Espeland explains 
that the Bureau’s attempt to translate land into instrumental terms led to political 
resistance by the Yavapai (who viewed land as an incommensurable value) and a 
reinterpretation of their collective identity (Espeland 1998: 40).  In the context of the 
Bank, the conflict over economizing human rights is leading to a reevaluation of 
professional identities (particularly among lawyers) as well as the institution’s own 
identity.   
The tension between principles and pragmatism that arises over human rights is 
part of a larger conflict over the Bank’s identity.  Although the Bank’s explicit mission is 
poverty reduction, it is a vague goal that is vulnerable to multiple interpretations.  As the 
Bank has taken on issues like the environment and judicial reform, internal and external 
critics have accused it of “mission creep,” which refers to the shifting of activities away 
from an organization’s original mandate (Einhorn 2001: 22).  One could distinguish 
between the Bank’s explicit mandate and multiple implicit mandates, which cover a 
range of poverty reduction-related issues.  There are internal battles over what constitutes 
the Bank’s true mission and what topics deserve to be funded more than others.  For 
example, when Bank managers have resisted issues like human rights (particularly civil 
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and political rights), they have defined them as outside the Bank’s mandate and thus 
unsuitable for the organization’s work program.  Other issues that are viewed as 
implicitly related to the Bank’s core mission, such as gender and social development, 
have been given fewer resources.  As a result, advocates for these issues have attempted 
to frame them as more pragmatic and measurable, in line with the Bank’s mainstream 
economic development goals. 
For example, Bank sociologists and anthropologists in the late 1990s and early 
2000s aimed to package the concept of social capital within an economic framework to 
give it legitimacy.  Yet in doing so, many of them struggled with the tension between 
principles and pragmatism.  They tried to design a concept that “could readily engage in 
conversations with the economic arguments underpinning much of the Bank’s activity” 
(Bebbington et al. 2004: 42).  They believed that if social capital could be quantified and 
discussed econometrically, it could bridge the gap between social development specialists 
and economists.  Yet, as with the debate over how to frame human rights, several non-
economists critiqued this approach.  They argued that converting social capital into a 
quantifiable asset “independent of the broader political economy does unacceptable 
violence to any concept of social relationships” (Bebbington e al. 2004: 46).  Would 
mainstreaming such concepts as social capital within an economic framework dilute them 
and cause irreparable damage?  If so, is this an acceptable cost because it may be the only 
way to introduce social issues into an economist-dominated institution like the Bank?   
Here we see the risks of translating human rights too far into the existing power 
structure.  As Sally Merry observes, if human rights “are translated so fully that they 
blend into existing power relationships completely, they lose their potential for social 
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change” (Merry 2006: 135-136).  This risk is part of the dilemma of human rights 
framing and “vernacularization” strategies: They will not induce radical, long-term 
change if they do not challenge existing power structures and are too compatible with 
dominant ways of thinking (Merry 2006:136, 222).  Yet they also need to resonate with 
local cultural understandings to appear legitimate and become part of local rights 
consciousness (Merry 2006: 137, 222).  This dilemma raises a number of important 
questions: Can human rights be so extensively vernacularized that they lose their 
essential core, or even contradict their fundamental meanings?  Must human rights retain 
a connection to a legal regime (and be linked to state obligations deriving from 
international law) to truly qualify as “human rights” and not another concept like 
“empowerment”?  My research suggests that the human rights vernacularization process 
is a continuous renegotiation of meanings among actors that constantly struggle for 
power.  In this way, human rights can function as an adaptable technology rather than just 
a fixed set of principles. 
 
Interpretive Pluralism over Human Rights  
 
 
In the introduction to this volume, Kamari Clarke and Mark Goodale seek to 
understand “the multiplicity of justice as it is constituted and reconstituted discursively, 
legally, and politically” (Introduction, this volume).  This chapter similarly uncovers the 
plural nature of the human rights framework and problematizes the relationship between 
human rights and law.  The fragmented character of human rights is due to its multiple 
and sometimes contradictory roles (e.g., as a tool of empowerment for weak, 
dispossessed individuals; as a unifying goal for social movements; and as a symbol of the 
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U.S.-led neoliberal project).  As Austin Sarat and Thomas Kearns argue, “the allure of 
human rights persists because they can, and do, mean many things at once. . . .  They both 
constitute us as subjects and provide a language through which we can resist that 
constitution and forge new identities” (Sarat and Kearns 2001: 6-7).  Human rights can be 
a double-edged sword because they can simultaneously be enabling and constraining (see 
Cowan 2006). 
Many anthropologists have adopted a discursive approach to human rights that 
“radically decenters international human rights law” and assumes that “social practice is, 
in part, constitutive of the idea of human rights itself” (Goodale 2007: 8; see also Baxi 
2002).  They have analyzed the paradoxical nature of rights discourse, as in the colonial 
context where the discourse’s dual registers of primordial sovereignty and radical 
individualism are simultaneously operating (Comaroff 1995).  They have also studied the 
impact of human rights on local social and political contexts, whether in a community or 
an international institution.  Such studies have addressed the interaction and possible 
conflicts between human rights discourse and other global normative discourses, such as 
those of justice or human dignity (Rajagopal 2007: 280).   
What have been underemphasized in existing studies are the power dynamics 
between the human rights discourse and other discourses and, most importantly, between 
human rights interpretations themselves.  Multiple discourses and their related agendas 
(including gender, corruption, and the environment, to name but a few) have entered the 
Bank over the past two decades.  Depending on which employee you ask, these 
discourses may operate in tension with the Bank’s dominant discourse of economic 
development.  Whether these discourses are commensurable or not, and how they 
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interact, depends on how they are interpreted.  According to my research, their 
interpretation in turn is related to the professional and social norms of employees.  Are 
the discourses of human rights and development reconcilable?  An economist, lawyer, 
and sociologist may respond differently, based on their professional training and their 
respective definitions of human rights and development.  Moreover, a civil society 
advocate or an Executive Director on the Bank’s Board may hold distinct interpretations 
as well. 
My research focuses on the interpretive pluralism over human rights among 
bureaucrats and, in particular, the conflict between the intrinsic and instrumental 
interpretations that closely correspond to different professionals (e.g., lawyers and 
economists, respectively).  The power relationship between interpretations depends on 
the institutional and social context where human rights are being situated.  As I described 
in this chapter, the lawyers leading the Bank’s Measuring Justice Initiative are attempting 
to operationalize a human rights agenda by applying an instrumental interpretation that 
resonates with the economists and economic thinking that are dominant within the 
institution.  Thus human rights norms are being “economized,” or framed for economists, 
to fit with the Bank’s organizational culture.  This study demonstrates that the conditions 
under which human rights are translated and diffused within an institution are shaped by 
the discursive politics among bureaucratic experts.  
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